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Abstract
While there is consensus on the need to raise the time spent in the market by European
women, it is not clear how these goals should be achieved. Tax wedges, assistance in the job
search process, and part-time jobs are policy instruments that are widely debated in policy
circles. The paper presents a simple model of labor supply with market frictions and
heterogenous home production where the effects of these policies can be coherently analyzed.
We show that subsidies to labor market entry increase women’s entrance in the labor market,
but they also increase exits from the labor market, with ambiguous effect on employment.
Subsidies to part-time do increase employment, but they have ambiguous effects on hours and
market production. Finally, reductions in taxes on market activities that are highly substitut-
able with home production have unambiguous positive effects on market employment and
production. (JEL: J0, J2)
1. Introduction
The low level of female employment in most South European countries has
attracted a great deal of attention by national and European policymakers. There
are indeed huge differences across Member States in the share of employed
women in the working age population, which is currently around 40% in
countries such as Spain, Italy, and Greece and around 70% in Nordic countries
(see Pissarides et al. 2003). At the intensive margin, recently collected empirical
evidence on use of time shows that the average North American and German
women spend the same share of time in leisure activities (Freeman and Schettkat
2002). Yet, the allocation of time between market and home production varies
greatly between the two countries, with North American women spending on
average 5.3 more hours per day in market activities than German women.
Further, most of this difference comes from differences in the extensive margin,
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with a large share of women in Germany devoted full time in home production
(child care, preparing meals, cleaning, etc.).
A fervid debate is currently devoted to finding specific policies that may
raise female employment rates. These policies should increase women’s incen-
tives to substitute household production with market production, so as to
increase the equilibrium level of employment and the size of official GDP.
While there is a large consensus on the need to raise the time spent in the market
by European women, there is some confusion over how these goals should be
achieved. Reducing the high tax wedge, developing part-time work and improv-
ing assistance in the job search process are often mentioned policies, but their
different effects are rarely discussed in a unified way. This generates some
confusion. For instance, a natural question about part-time is whether it should
be strongly encouraged, or whether one should simply avoid making part-time
jobs unattractive relative to full-time jobs.1 However, this type of question is
rarely explicitly formulated. We believe that part of the confusion over the role
and the effect of these various policies is linked to the lack of a unified analytical
model where the different set of policies can be coherently analyzed. The goal
of this paper is to propose such a framework.
To contribute to the debate, two key features of the labor market must
necessarily be considered. The first element is heterogeneity in individual’s
utility in nonmarket time (e.g., the ability to produce at home or the utility of
leisure). The second element is the existence of imperfections in the labor
market. In this paper we build on the recent work of Garibaldi and Wasmer
(2001), who have developed a theory of labor supply for a frictional labor
market. In particular, they showed that when labor market participation involves
an irreversible entry cost and market production is indivisible, the entry and exit
decisions differ, and the participation decision is described by a double margin.
Since the different policies described previously affect the two margins differ-
ently, and sometimes have an opposite impact (e.g., raise the propensity to enter
the labor market while at the same time raise the propensity to leave the labor
market), we need to clarify the effects of female employment policies on
employment rates, market production and welfare.
We consider the three policies discussed previously in details: Subsidies to
labor market entry, taxation to market activity, and subsidies to part-time. With
respect to subsidies to labor market entry (which can also be interpreted as
subsidies to mobility), the paper shows that they lead to an increase in the
number of women entering the labor market. Yet, the overall effect on total
employment can be ambiguous, since subsidies tend to reduce participation
1. Typically part-time jobs are associated with less health insurance, less employment protection,
and lower unemployment benefits.
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hoarding and thus increase exits from the market.2 Less ambiguous and more
standard results derive from the effects of taxation on market activities, which
have non-neutral effects on participation since household production can not be
taxed. Our analysis shows that a reduction in taxes leads to both larger entry and
lower exit with unambiguous positive effect on total employment. These results
are consistent with the recent work of Davis and Henrekson (2003) and Prescott
(2002). Finally, we discuss also the effects of part-time. Our theory shows that
an increase in part-time should never be banned, and any form of implicit
obstacle should be removed. Yet, our results show that a subsidy to part time has
two opposite effects on market production. If it indeed induces women that are
full time in home production to enter part-time in the labor market (crowding in
effect), it can also induce some women who are working full-time in the market
to swap to part-time (a crowding-out effect). The overall effect on market
production is thus ambiguous and depends on how the mass of women is
positioned around the initial equilibrium. Nevertheless, if the distribution of
home productivity is single-peaked, the positive effect on employment domi-
nates if and only if the marginal participant is to the left of the peak of the
distribution, or in words, when the employment rate is low.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 derives the setup, the reservation
strategies of workers and introduces a definition of welfare and expressions for
aggregate home production, employment and hours. Section 3 investigates the
role of subsidies to entry and taxes. Section 4 deals with part-time. Section 5
concludes.
2. Labor Supply on the Extensive Margins in an Imperfect
Labor Market
2.1. Setup
In this section we extend the baseline model of labor supply with market
frictions proposed by Garibaldi and Wasmer (2001). These extensions help us
to discuss two policies that are widely debated in the discussion over female
employment: the effects of marginal income taxes and policies aimed at facil-
itating entrance in the labor market. The role of part-time employment will be
discussed in the next section.
We assume that a mass one of women enjoys utility from home production
and market production. Women have a unit of time to be spent in market and
2. Participation hoarding is defined as the willingness to participate to the labor market even
though the felicity derived from home production is larger than the wage, in order to save on future
reentry costs in case of a change in either wages or home production. See Garibaldi and Wasmer
(2001).
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home production, two activities that we assume to be perfect substitutes. This is
a strong assumption, but we maintain it throughout the paper for analytical
simplicity, since it implies that women will specialize in the activity in which
they are most productive. We assume that hours spent in market production are
exogenously fixed and equal to one. In other words, market production is a full
time activity, and our emphasis is on the extensive margin of labor supply. In
market production people are paid a gross wage net of taxes, so that the take
home pay for a full day in the market is y  w(1  t), where t is the tax rate.
Utility from home production is heterogenous and stochastic and its value
changes according to a Poisson at rate . A full day in home production yields
a per period utility equal to x, where x is drawn from a continuous cumulative
distribution F(x) defined over the support   [xmin, xmax]. Further, home
production cannot be taxed. The per period utility of women is
vw  w1  t
vH  x
The key worker decision involves the time to be spent in market production.
In absence of frictions in the market, the model is trivial and the participation
decision is described by a single reservation value x*  w(1  t), so that all
individuals with home production below x* participate full time in market
activity. In reality, information on the location and the availability of jobs is not
perfect, and the process of information gathering is akin to paying an irrevers-
ible entry cost equal to . Indeed, in our previous research we have shown that
from the labor supply standpoint modelling the search process as a time
consuming process is identical to assuming that entering the labor market
involves an irreversible entry cost. In the current paper, we keep the irreversible
cost assumption, and we assume that  is determined by both technological and
policy dimensions. Job search assistance and training and mobility subsidies
represent the policy dimension: Both aims at reducing the irreversible cost paid
by market entrance.
2.2. Reservation Strategies
The existence of the irreversible cost  induces a distinction of the entry and
exit decision. If we indicate with H the value function for being full-time in
home production and with W the value function for being full-time in market
production, the two margins are defined as
Entry: HxWx 
Quit: HxqWxq,
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where x is the entry cut-off point and xq is the exit cut-off point. To determine
an expression for the two cut off points requires some algebra, since the
intertemporal nature of the model does play a role. Formally, the value function
of being in market activity reads
rWx w1 t  maxWz, HzdFzWx ,
where r is the pure rate of time preferences. The equation has a standard asset
value interpretation, and the integral in the right hand side simply says that
conditional on a change in home productivity, the woman reoptimizes her
position on the extensive margin. Similarly, the value of being full-time in home
production reads
rHx x  maxWz , HzdFz Hx .
Developing the algebra of the two margins, one obtains two equations for the
two cutoff points whose expression read
xq  x
r 
  (Entry)
xq  x* 

r  
x
xq
Fzdz. (Quit)
In the first equation, the entry margin shows that the surplus on the job (the left
hand side in the equation) is equal to the entry cost. It also shows that when the
entry cost is positive, xq  x. The second equation, the quit margin, says in the
case of positive , the quit cutoff points is above the frictionless cutoff point x*
by an extra term that reflects the fact that women hold on to market production
as a way to save future entry costs if home production were to change. Note that
the two equations can be described by two lines in a [xq, x] space. The entry
margin is upward sloping and it is parallel to the 45° line. It is also easy to show
that the quit margin is downward sloping as long as   0, and is a horizontal
line at x* when   0. The cutoff point equilibrium is given by the intersection
of the two lines. We use this graphical representation in Figure 1 to analyse the
effect of policies. Note that the two equations (Entry) and (Quit) imply that as
friction disappears (  0) the two cutoff points coincide with the net wage. In
Garibaldi and Wasmer (2001), we showed that the cutoff points are such that
xq  x*  x
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where x*  w(1  t) is the frictionless participation margin, that is, the
neoclassical reservation rule, and strict inequality holds whenever   0.
2.3. Employment, Market Production, and Welfare
The model is then closed by the determination of the stock of employed and
nonemployed people. Developing the algebra, the steady stock of employed
people is
e 
F x
1  F x  F xq (1)
n  1  e 
1  F xq
1  F x  F xq (2)
where e is total employment and it increases with both margins while n is
nonemployment and falls with both margins. To define aggregate home pro-
duction H and GDP, we need to take into account the fact that not all workers
between the two cutoff points are engaged in full-time production, since some
of them are also employed. Denote by  	 1 the fraction of nonemployed
workers between x and xq. It is easy to show that   n.3 Market GDP and
aggregate home production H are thus defined as
H   
x
xq
x dF x  
xq
xmax
xdFx
3. It is easy to verify that the number of employed workers below x is F(x ) while the number
of inactive workers above xq is 1  F(xq). Between x and xq, one finds both employed and
nonemployed workers. Unreported steady state conditions on stocks imply that
 
n  1  F xq
n  1  F xq  e  F x  n.
FIGURE 1. The effects of subsidizing entry (lowering , left panel) or reducing taxation of market
activity (reducing t, right panel) on the entry and exit margins.
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GDP  
xmin
x
ydFx 1  
x
xq
ydFx ye .
The second equality in the GDP definition states that total production is simply
proportional to employment since the choice of hours is inelastic. Note also that
the net wage w is assumed to decrease by one to one when t increases so that
the marginal product y is constant. Accordingly, taxes affect market GDP only
through their effects on cutoff points.
Finally, welfare is the sum of both home and market production net of entry
costs, that is,
  n 
x
xq
x dF x  
xq
xmax
xdFx y1 n Fxn ,
where the last part is simply the steady-state number of entrants to the labor
markets multiplied by their entry cost.
3. Subsidies to Entry to the Labor Market and Reductions in Taxation
3.1. The Effects of Reducing the Irreversible Entry Cost
We now want to consider the effect of two possible policies for increasing
employment. The first one is a subsidy to labor market entry, which can also be
interpreted as a subsidy to mobility or a subsidy job search assistance. All
interpretations are consistent with a reduction in the entry cost  at the
individual level. Such a reduction in  will induce an increase in labor market
entrance, as more women will have an incentive to supply market hours. But our
simple model immediately shows that the story is more complicated, since a
reduction in  not only raise the entry cutoff point, but it also reduce the quit
cutoff point. The overall effect on employment is thus ambiguous. As displayed
in the left part of Figure 1, a reduction in  induces a downward shift in the
entry margin along the quit margin, with a reduction of both xq and x. What
happens to employment is then ambiguous, and depends on the relative density
of people that are sitting in the entry or in the quit margin. Note that the fall in
the quit margin disappears if   0 since in that case, the quit margin is
horizontal. By extension, when  is close to zero, the positive entry effect
dominates over the negative quit effect. In terms of welfare, simply note that the
lower , the closer the equilibrium is from the first best neoclassical labor
supply model.
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3.2. The Effects of Taxation
We now consider the second policy, namely the effect of reducing the tax rate
t. As displayed in the right part of Figure 1, the increase in taxation is equivalent
to a shift of the quit margin along the entry margin, leading to a reduction in
both the entry and the quit cutoff points. The effect of a reduction in t is now
independent of the fact that  is positive or zero, and amounts to a an increase
in both margins with positive effects on the entry and the quit margin. A
reduction in tax shifts people out of home production into full-time market
activity, increasing both employment and market production.
This is consistent with the literature on the effects of taxation on market
activity carried out by Davis and Henrekson (2003). They find a high cross-
country correlation between taxation and employment rates in high substitution
industries such as household and personal services, eating, drinking, lodging,
and retail trade. Inasmuch as women can engage at home in activities that are
highly substitutable to market production, a high tax wedge clearly generates an
incentive to move away from market production. As a result, a reduction in
taxes on those activities has unambiguous effects on employment and market
production.
4. Part-time Labor
Let us introduce part-time labor in our simple theory. We assume that workers
can now work part-time in the labor market, and have the same productivity per
hour y as in full-time activity, and thus the same gross hourly wage w. In this
discussion, we don’t need a full intertemporal structure and set  to zero. We
thus simply focus on flow utility, and denote by W, P, and H full-time market
activity, part-time market activity and full-time home production. Denote by t
the tax rate on full-time activity and t1/2 the tax rate on part-time activity. A
large value of t1/2 can also feature differences in worker’s valuation of part-time
jobs, such as reduced social security. If working part-time requires half a unit of
time, the indirect utility functions are thus W(x)  y(1  t); P(x)  [x 
 y(1 
t1/2)]/2 and H(x)  x.
It can be remarked that beyond taxes, here there is no specific preference for
part-time since there is perfect substitutability between home production and
market income. Later on in this section we shall relax this assumption. In the
baseline model without taxes, there is a single cut-off point x*  y such that
W x*  P x*  H x* ,
where women below x* are in full-time activity and people above x* are in
full-time home production. If there is a mass point of individuals at x  y then
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this mass of workers is indifferent between the three states and a positive
fraction of them may be in part-time.
Now, suppose that the government wishes to encourage part-time, by
reducing taxes on part-time jobs and setting it to t1/2 	 t. Let us denote by  the
relative increment in wages obtained by workers, with of course   (t 
t1/2)/(1  t) is decreasing in t1/2 and increasing in t. We assume that the
reduction in taxes is financed through a lump-sum tax on all households. The
main question we want to address is what happens to market hours and market
production.
Intuitively a larger mass of workers take a part-time job and the relevant
cutoff values of x are now
xh  y1    y

xw  y1    y
since utility is simply given by W(x)  y; P(x)  (x 
 y(1  ))/2; H(x)  x.
People above xh are full time in home production, people below xw are full-time
on the job and people in the interval [xw  xh] are in part-time. The subsidy to
part-time employment leads to an increase in total employment, since the
number of employed women raise from F(y) to F(y
)  F(y(1 
 )). This is
an extensive margin result. Turning to production and thus indirectly to the total
number of hours, we have
GDP  
0
y
ydFx
1
2 y 
y
y

dFx
y
2 Fy
 Fy

RESULT 1. Market GDP is increased by a larger  iff if F is locally convex
around y, that is, iff f(y)  0. For small , the effect on market production in
absolute value is proportional to  and thus disappear as  is zero.
To see this, simply note that 	GDP/	  y3f(y) after a Taylor expansion
around   0. To understand the ambiguous effect of this result, one has to
realize that a subsidy to part time has two effects on market production. On the
one hand, it induces women that are full time in home production to enter
part-time in the labor market (crowding in effect). On the other hand it induces
women who are working full-time in the market to swap to part-time (a
crowding out effect). The overall effect on market production is thus ambiguous
and depends on how the mass of women is positioned around the initial
equilibrium. If in the initial equilibrium the mass of women who marginally
prefers full time home production is larger (lower) than the mass of women who
marginally prefers full-time home production (i.e., if the density is locally
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increasing), the crowding in (out) effect dominates and market production
increases (falls). If the two mass of women is identical, than there is no effect
on market production. An alternative formulation of this statement is that, if the
distribution of x is single-peaked, then subsiding part-time will increase hours
and market production if the marginal worker is to the left of the peak, while it
would reduce them if the marginal worker is to the right of the peak.
One can also check what happens to aggregate home production H, and
after few similar steps of algebra one finds that
	H
	
 
	GDP
	
 y2f yy2yf y f y
The first line shows that part of the effect of a relative subsidy to part-time  is
a transfer from market production to home production, plus a deadweight loss
represented by the mass of people at the extensive margin, that is, y2f (y). The
second line indicates that the sign of the effect on home production depends on
the sign of the derivative of the function yf (y) with respect to y.
There are two possible extensions to this simple model. The first one is to
relax the assumption that there is no specific preference for part-time. This is
equivalent to relaxing the perfect substitutability in x and y and have instead a
flow utility u((1  e)x, ey) with e  {0, 1⁄2, 1} that refers to the hours spent in
the market. We can show that in this analytical more complex model a subsidy
to part-time would still generate a crowding in and a crowding out effect. The
intuition of Result 1 would still carry along, so that the overall effect would still
be affected by the slope of the density function f at the cut off points. A second
extension would be to introduce worker’s heterogeneity on market production
rather than on home production. If we assume that market productivity y is
dispersed in the population with a c.d.f. F˜ while x is common to individuals, the
problem is formally identical to the one of this paper: We can simply solve it by
replacing W by H and vice versa. The effects of the subsidy on part-time would
still depend on the slope of the density f˜ at the initial equilibrium.
5. Conclusion
While in Europe there is large consensus on the need to raise the time spent in
the market by European women, there is some confusion about the ways in
which these goals should be achieved. This paper has presented a simple and
original model of labor supply in an imperfect labor market. We showed that
subsidies to labor market entry increase women’s entrance in the labor market,
but they also increase exits from the labor market, with ambiguous effect on
employment. Furthermore, subsidies to part-time do increase employment, but
they have ambiguous effects on hours and market production. Finally, we show
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that reductions in taxes on market activities that are highly substitutable with
home production have unambiguous positive effects on market employment and
production.
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